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Abstract 
 
We analyze the effects of ownership type and concentration on performance of a 
population of firms in a model large-scale privatization economy (Czech Republic). 
Using specifications based on first-differences and unique instrumental variables, we find 
that few types of private ownership improve dynamic post-privatization performance. 
Concentrated foreign (but not domestic) ownership improves some measures of 
performance relative to state ownership. Foreign investors engage in strategic 
restructuring by increasing the rate of change of sales, while domestic private owners 
reduce the rate of change of sales and labor cost without increasing profitability. The 
effects of concentrated foreign ownership support the agency theory and go against 
theories stressing the positive effects of managerial autonomy and initiative. Our results 
are also consistent with the thesis that large domestic stockholders are not improving 
performance because they loot the firms. We find some support for the hypothesis that 
firms restructure by first lowering and later increasing the rate of change of employment. 
The state as a holder of the golden share has a positive effect on employment, while 
stimulating profitable restructuring. The state hence appears as a more economically and 
socially helping agent than in some recent studies.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental and most controversial economic questions is whether 
private firms perform better than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and whether 
privatization improves firm performance. There is now a large literature on the subject of 
ownership structure and firm performance, and the issue has gained currency as large-
scale privatizations have taken place in many of the former command economies and 
developing countries. The issue is also of interest because the most populous and rapidly 
growing countries, China and India, are in the process of privatizing their state-owned 
firms. Unfortunately, the literature has generated surprisingly diverse findings and many 
results are questionable because of serious data limitations and inability of researchers to 
control adequately for endogeneity of ownership. In this paper, we address these issues 
by analyzing the performance effects of ownership changes in a population of firms in a 
model large-scale privatization economy (Czech Republic), using instrumental variables 
(IVs) from a rich data set on pre-market initial conditions of these firms.  
Interestingly, while privatization is based on the premise that it will improve 
corporate performance and help countries grow, the effect has been surprisingly hard to 
identify. At the macro level, one observes that some of the fastest large-scale privatizers 
(e.g., Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic) experienced a decline or slow growth 
after privatization in the 1990s, while some of the fastest growing transition economies in 
the 1990s (e.g., China, Poland and Slovenia) were among the slowest to privatize. In a 
cross-country aggregate study, Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000) find that privatization does 
not by itself increase GDP growth, but they suggest that a positive effect is present when 
privatization is accompanied by in-depth institutional reforms. Careful micro-  2
econometric studies date back to Caves and Christensen’s (1980) classic study that found 
private and state-owned Canadian railways performing equally efficiently in a head-on 
competition. Recent surveys of privatization studies based on micro data come up with 
assessments that range from finding a large variation of outcomes but no systematically 
significant effect of privatization on performance (Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer, 1999), to 
cautiously concluding that privatization around the world improves firm performance 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), to being fairly confident that privatization tends to 
improve performance (Shirley and Walsh, 2000, and Djankov and Murrell, 2002).
1  
In part, the variation in results is brought about by the fact that the early studies 
had access to different and often very limited data on firm ownership.
2 For these reasons, 
most studies treat ownership as a relatively simple categorical concept (e.g., private v. 
state or state v. foreign, domestic private outsider v. domestic private insider), and they 
are often unable to distinguish the exact extent of ownership by individual owners or 
even relatively homogeneous groups of owners. As we discuss below, the inability to 
distinguish the extent of different forms of ownership also prevents many studies from 
providing evidence on a lively theoretical debate about the desirability of concentrated vs. 
dispersed ownership on corporate performance.
3 
Equally important, the diversity of findings is generated by three types of 
interrelated analytical problems that may be expected in early studies, especially those in 
the context of the rapidly changing transition economies. First, the early studies rely on 
short time periods with observations concentrated immediately before and after 
                                                           
1 A theoretical analysis and overview of privatization and firm performance in transition is provided by 
Roland (2000). 
2 See for example Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997), Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997), 
Claessens and Djankov (1999), and Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000).   3
privatization.
4 They may hence at best capture the short–term effects of privatization, 
namely those associated with defensive (reactive) restructuring of firms, rather than the 
medium and long-term effects of a switch from state to a relatively stable form of private 
or mixed ownership.
5 Second, the early studies (a) use small and often unrepresentative 
samples of firms, (b) are frequently unable to identify accurately ownership because 
privatization is still ongoing or because the frequent post-privatization changes of 
ownership are hard to detect, and (c) often combine panel data from different accounting 
systems.
6 Third, many of the early studies have not been able to control adequately for 
endogeneity of ownership (firms not being selected for privatization at random), and their 
estimates of the effects of privatization may hence be biased (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 
2000).
7 
In this paper, we advance the literature by estimating the performance effects of 
key ownership patterns that we construct from detailed information on the extent of firm 
ownership by various owners. We exploit the fact that we know the identity of all firms in 
our large data set and have detailed information about their ownership and key indicators 
of performance. We are hence able to estimate the effects of ownership forms and 
degrees of ownership concentration that could not be examined before. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 An important recent exception is Grosfeld and Tressel (2001). 
4 For example, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) use a 1990-93 sample of about 200 firms 
pooled from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; D’Souza and Megginson (1999) analyze 85 
companies from 28 countries; Boubakri and Cosset (1998) use a 79 firm sample covering 29 countries; 
Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) use a sample of 260-340 Russian shops during the 1992-
93 period; Bilsen and Konings (1998) use survey data for 1990–94 on about 260 firms divided among 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary; Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) use a sample of 173 of the largest 500 
companies in Poland during the 1988-1994 period; and Claessens and Djankov (1999) use data on 
approximately 700 manufacturing firms from the Czech Republic during 1993-97. 
5 See Grosfeld and Roland (1997) and Aghion and Carlin (1996) for discussions of defensive and reactive 
restructuring. 
6 See also Claessens (1997) and Filer and Hanousek (2002) for a discussion of these issues. 
7 Gupta et al.’s (2000) econometric evidence indicates that better performing firms tend to be privatized 
first.   4
Moreover, we address systematically the three types of above-mentioned 
problems found in existing studies. In particular, we (a) use panel data on a virtually 
complete population of medium and large firms that went through large-scale 
privatization in a model economy (Czech Republic) and that constitute the bulk of the 
country’s economic activity,
8 (b) cover a four-year period after privatization when 
accounting rules conforming to the international (IAP) standard were already in place, (c) 
control for possible endogeneity of ownership using a first-difference as well as IV 
estimators, and (d) estimate the effects of ownership and changes in ownership after 
large-scale privatization. Compared to other studies, our paper also has the advantage of 
being based on more detailed data on ownership and an unusual set of instrumental 
variables capturing pre-market firm-level conditions. We also develop a more systematic 
analytical framework that allows us to evaluate the performance effect of initial post-
privatization ownership as well as to distinguish between instantaneous and permanent 
effects of ownership changes. Finally, unlike other studies, we estimate the principal 
effects in both linear and nonlinear form.
9 
                                                           
8 Since we use data on virtually the entire population of large and medium sized firms in the Czech 
Republic, one may think of our data as a country sample drawn from the population of centrally planned 
economies that went through large-scale privatization. The Central European economies have served as 
models for other transition countries in that early on they carried out important reforms and policy makers 
from other countries and international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have used them as examples to follow. In this context, the Czech Republic has served as the example 
of rapid large-scale privatization in a previously unreformed and virtually completely state-owned 
economy, while Hungary has been the example of piece-meal privatization of individual firms in a 
previously reformed and partially privately owned economy. 
9 The present paper belongs to a second generation of empirical studies that are being carried out to analyze 
corporate performance in the post-privatization period and employ large samples or populations of firm-
level data from specific types of privatization in a given country. These studies are able to avoid some of 
the aforementioned problems and take into account specific institutional settings. Thus, Bornstein (2001) 
for instance examines the post-privatization restructuring of former SOEs, including examples from the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Angelucci, Estrin, Konings and Zólkiewski (2002) use a large 
representative panel of manufacturing firms covering the years 1997-98 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 
1994 and 1998 for Poland. Carlin, Fries, Schaffer and Seabright (2001) employ an EBRD cross-sectional 
survey of 3,300 firms in 25 transition countries to identify factors that influence restructuring by firms and 
their subsequent performance as measured by growth in sales and in sales per employee over the 1996-1998   5
In addition, the fact that we use data from a model large-scale privatization 
economy that started almost completely state-owned and within a short time span 
underwent virtually complete privatization and large subsequent changes in ownership 
means that we are analyzing a population of firms that experienced one of the greatest 
recorded changes in ownership. Since a number of other countries, including Russia and 
Ukraine, started from almost complete state ownership and have carried out large-scale 
privatizations and subsequent changes in ownership, obtaining an understanding of the 
effects of this process and its aftermath is of considerable interest. Unlike studies of 
partial privatization, we also benefit from a large variation in the variables whose effect 
we analyze. 
Finally, by carrying out a detailed study of one model economy, we are able to 
take into account specific legal and institutional features that relate to ownership and 
control, and avoid the problem of not being able to control adequately for complex cross-
country differences in the institutional and legal frameworks that confront comparative 
studies with a limited number of country-specific observations.
10 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide information on 
the privatization process that generates our data, while in Section 3 we discuss the 
relevant features of the legal system and the hypothesized implications of different types 
of ownership on firm performance. In Section 4, we describe the data and basic statistics 
and in Section 5 we outline our empirical strategy. We present our empirical estimates in 
Section 6 and we draw conclusions in Section 7. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
period. Lizal and Svejnar (2002) use 1992-98 panel data on the population of medium and large Czech 
industrial firms to examine investment behavior and the extent of credit rationing and soft budget 
constraints by ownership and corporate form of firms.   6
 
2. Privatization in the Czech Republic 
The privatization program in the Czech Republic was carried out in the first half 
of the 1990s under three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization and 
large-scale privatization. The first two schemes started in 1990 and were most important 
during the early years of the transition. Large-scale privatization, by far the most 
important scheme, began in 1991 and was completed in early 1995.
11 The privatization 
program allowed various privatization techniques. Small firms were usually auctioned or 
sold in tenders. Many medium businesses were sold in tenders or to pre-determined 
buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium firms were transformed into joint 
stock companies and their shares were distributed through voucher privatization (almost 
one-half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized in 
the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred to 
municipalities. 
The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process and it 
attracted considerable interest and publicity.
12 Two waves of voucher privatization took 
place in 1992-93 and 1993-94, respectively. The early post-privatization ownership 
structure emerged as shares from the second wave were distributed in early 1995. Rapid 
reallocation of shares across new owners took place in 1995-96 during the so-called 
"third wave" of privatization as new owners, including the investment privatization funds 
(IPFs), reshaped their initial post-privatization portfolios of acquired companies. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 The leading studies in this area (e.g.,Boubakri and Cosset, 1998, Frydman et al., 1999, D’Souza and 
Megginson, 1999) are forced by paucity of data to use pooled cross-country calculations and regressions to 
derive their key findings. 
11 The privatization process has been extensively described and analyzed. See e.g., Svejnar and Singer 
(1994), Kotrba (1995), Coffee (1996), and Kočenda (1999).   7
Depending on the investor, the swapping of shares in 1995-96 was aimed at (a) optimal 
portfolio diversification, (b) obtaining concentrated ownership in specific firms and 
industries and (c) achieving conformity with legal requirements aimed at preventing 
excessive stakes being held by privatization funds.
13  
The 1995-96 ownership changes were massive, unregulated and frequently 
unobservable to outsiders, including researchers. Investors, especially the IPFs, engaged in 
direct swaps of large blocks of shares, and off-market share trading was common. More 
stable and, from the standpoint of firm performance, more meaningful patterns of 
ownership emerged in 1996. We analyze the 1996-99 performance effects of various 
patterns of ownership and their changes after the dust of large-scale privatization and 
early post-privatization ownership swaps settled. 
 
3. Forms of Ownership and Hypothesized Effects on Performance  
Concentrated or Dispersed Ownership? 
The link between firm performance and ownership is often viewed as going 
through the interaction and power distribution between the owners and managers of 
firms. In this context, the issue that has received major renewed attention, without 
resulting in a consensus, is whether concentrated or dispersed ownership is more 
conducive to good corporate governance and performance. The literature that focuses on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 The voucher scheme is sometimes erroneously referred to as the large-scale privatization program itself. 
13 The regulation of IPFs evolved gradually through Decree no. 383/1991, its Amendment No. 62/1992, and 
Act No. 248/1992. The most important clauses restricted each privatization fund from investing more than 
10% of points acquired in the voucher scheme in a single company and obtaining in exchange more than 
20% of shares in any company. Privatization funds established by a single founder were allowed to 
accumulate up to 40% of shares in a given company, but this cap was later reduced to 20%. Many 
privatization funds circumvented the cap through mergers. The Act also prohibited IPFs founded by 
financial institutions from purchasing shares of other financial institutions to prevent excessive 
concentration of financial capital (for details see Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994).   8
the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control usually argues 
for the desirability of concentrated ownership because it results in superior monitoring of 
managers, maximization of shareholder value and availability of external finance for the 
firms (see e.g., a survey by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(2000) have shown, the agency problem may exist even when a large (minority) 
shareholder is present -- if this shareholder loots the firm at the expense of small 
shareholders. On the other hand, models of asymmetric information and optimal 
delegation of authority (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997) point to the importance of 
managerial initiative and incentives to acquire information, highlighting the fact that 
concentrated ownership with little delegation of formal authority to managers may be 
deleterious to firm performance.
14 Similarly, the literature pioneered by Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1983) points out that concentrated ownership reduces market liquidity and hence 
lowers the benefits of market monitoring on corporate performance. Finally, Bolton and 
von Thadden (1998) argue that concentrated ownership per se may or may not be 
desirable, showing that a reasonable alternative is ownership dispersion with trading in 
secondary markets or ease of takeovers generating concentration whenever necessary for 
intervention in managerial decision-making. 
Since we are able to identify all owners with ownership stakes of 10 percent or 
more, we can classify all firms into categories that allow us to test the validity of the 
competing predictions from the above theories. Depending on their stakes, different 
blockholders have different capacity to influence corporate governance. In particular, the 
Czech law provides important rights of ownership and control to owners with majority 
                                                           
14 See Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) for an articulation of this and the following interpretations.   
   9
ownership (more than 50 percent of shares), blocking minority ownership (more than 33 
percent but not more than 50 percent of shares) and what we define as legal minority 
ownership (at least 10 but not more than 33 percent of shares).
15 Majority ownership 
grants the owner the right to staff management and supervisory boards, to alter and/or 
transfer firms' assets and to adopt most crucial strategic decisions at general shareholders' 
meetings. Through management and supervisory boards, majority ownership allows also 
more direct executive control over the company. The blocking minority ownership gives 
the right to block a number of decisions, such as those related to increasing or reducing 
assets and implementing major changes in business activities that the majority 
shareholder may strive to implement at the general shareholders' meeting. Finally, legal 
minority ownership can be considered a form of dispersed ownership since its 
concentration is low and its direct impact on routine business decisions is limited. On the 
other hand, it is potentially important since the law entitles the holder of such a stake to 
call the general shareholders' meeting and obstruct its decisions by delaying their 
implementation through lengthy court proceedings. Effective legal minority shareholders 
(including the state) may thus use their ownership position to delay or completely block 
the implementation of decisions by stronger shareholder(s).
16 
                                                           
15 In principle, we cannot fully trace ownership stakes of less than 10 percent since their reporting is not 
required by law. This limitation is not particularly constraining for our analysis for two reasons. First, by 
having data on all owners with 10 percent or more ownership, we are able to estimate the effects of the 
most relevant degrees of concentration and dispersion of ownership, ranging from a single owner having 
majority ownership, to no single owner having the legal (10 percent) minority ownership. Second, as we 
discuss below, we are able to trace even ownership stakes of less than 10 percent (reported voluntarily) in 
firms that are of particular analytical interest to us. 
16 Interesting effect is observed in the case of portfolio companies that are primarily interested in capital 
gains. These companies have been observed to buy 10 percent positions in firms where they can sell the 
stake at a premium to the dominant shareholder whose business strategy is to avoid excessive scrutiny by 
an institutionally strong minority shareholder.   10
Overall, the majority and blocking minority represent different degrees of 
concentrated ownership, while the legal minority may be viewed as a form of moderately 
dispersed ownership. Highly dispersed ownership arises when the stake of the largest 
holder held does not reach legal (10 percent) minority. We are also able to distinguish 
whether the government keeps a golden share that gives it the right to veto certain 
managerial decisions, such as the subject of business activities, termination of provided 
services, sales of assets, etc., and indirectly to influence all managerial decisions. 
Institutional evidence suggests that the golden share may be an important mechanism 
enabling the state to exert a degree of influence over firms in which it no longer holds a 
sufficient ownership stake.
17 
Types of Ownership 
Most empirical work has focused on relatively broad categories of ownership such 
as government versus private, domestic versus foreign and insiders (managers and 
workers) versus outsiders. While useful as a first-order approximation, it is desirable to 
assess if finer distinctions that reflect the different goals and business activities of owners 
provide a clearer understanding of the effects of different types of ownership and 
corporate governance. In our analysis, we take a step in this direction by examining six 
types of domestic and two types of foreign ownership that are hypothesized to have 
differing implications for corporate objectives, constraints and governance. 
                                                           
17 The golden share was introduced by Act No. 210/1993, modifying Act No. 92/1991. The act set the 
conditions for property transfer from the state to others with the aim of protecting special interests of the 
state in firms privatized in large-scale privatization. The veto rights associated with the golden share 
usually relate to the scope and line of business activity and depend on each company’s charter. When the 
state sells its golden share, it gives up its rights in the company and the golden share ceases to exist. The 
instrument of the golden share in the Czech Republic does not conform fully to that found in other 
countries since it is limited to being solely an instrument of state control and does not serve as a means of 
attracting free or less expensive credit.   11
The six types of domestic owners are industrial company, bank, investment fund, 
individual, portfolio company, and state, while the two types of foreign owners are 
industrial company and all other owners.
18 The ownership of a firm by an industrial 
company is normally expected to increase profitability through cost cutting, vertical or 
horizontal integration of activities, and possibly expansion aimed at exploiting economies 
of scale. However, in the incomplete legal and institutional framework of transition, one 
might observe an opposite effects if the parent company’s management appropriates the 
acquired company’s profits and/or assets (i.e., tunnels) or if it uses the company for tax 
evasion or other private purposes. 
A significant bank ownership or credit exposure to a firm should impose pressure 
on the firm’s management to improve profitability (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer, 1996). 
However, the newly-created banks found themselves holding large credit and ownership 
positions in hundreds of firms and had only limited ability to staff the firms’ management 
and supervisory boards with capable individuals.
19 Moreover, the banks’ ownership role 
was weakened by their lending relationship with the firms they owned and by laws and 
regulations that limited their authority and tolerated corruption (see Lízal and Kočenda, 
2001). The direction of the effect of bank ownership on performance is hence an 
empirical question. 
Investment funds were created during large-scale privatization as diversified 
mutual funds. They are expected to pursue profitable opportunities and can take 
                                                           
18 Since insiders have not been important in the Czech Republic, we do not analyze this type of ownership. 
We also do not examine whether a given owner belongs to a larger ownership group. With considerable 
additional data collection, this could be an interesting topic for future research. 
19 Ownership involvement of Czech banks in other companies resembles the situation in Germany. Allen 
and Gale (1995), with reference to the German financial market, argue that the fact that the market for 
corporate control collapses when stock markets are thin could be made up for by the role of banks as   12
significant equity positions even in large firms. This may in turn translate into emphasis 
on sound corporate governance and restructuring of firms. In the short term, however, the 
funds may focus on increasing the value of the stocks held in their portfolios by strategic 
trading rather than by pursuing issues of corporate governance at the level of individual 
firms.
20 Moreover, a number of observers have pointed out that the corporate governance 
of many of the funds themselves has been weak (e.g., Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). 
Thus, the fund managers could use controlling ownership stakes to extract benefits from 
the company at the expense of minority shareholders, and enrich themselves at the 
expense of fund depositors.
21 
Individual ownership is widely perceived as an ideal form of corporate 
governance with the residual claimant having very strong incentives to monitor the 
management. The impact of these incentives should become even stronger when the 
individual owner is part of management. 
The portfolio companies in the Czech Republic are diversified investment 
companies that engage in business with both corporate and private customers. Their 
ownership positions in large individual firms are more limited than that of the funds, and 
their goal is to realize short-term capital gains. As such, they normally do not participate 
in corporate governance. While the experience in advanced market economies indicates 
that portfolio companies own significant stakes and often force management to become 
more profitable, it is not clear that this aspect of performance would be found in the post-
privatization period. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
delegated monitors holding equity and exercising their voting rights. Czech banks, with their numerous 
holdings, were given the above option; however, their ability to cope with it might not be strong. 
20 Jensen (2000, p.220) for instance argues that mutual funds tend to survive when they hold securities of 
firms that trade at low valuations in secondary markets.   13
The state, as an owner, may pursue various goals, including economic efficiency, 
tax revenues, or social goals such as employment. The results of Gupta et al. (2000) 
suggest that revenue maximization was important in the privatization phase, but other 
goals, such as employment generation, may be important in the post-privatization phase 
when unemployment was on the rise. 
Finally, in a country with low labor cost and favorable profit repatriation rules, 
foreign owners are likely to aim at generating profits and, if the local products can be sold 
through their transnational network, also on increasing output and hence employment. 
 
4. The Data and Basic Statistics 
4.1 Performance Data 
Profitability is widely viewed as the best ultimate measure of corporate 
performance, and we use two measures of profitability as our dependent variables: the 
annual rate of change of operating profit on sales (profit/sales or return on sales) and the 
annual change in the return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the change in 
operating profit between periods t-1 and t to total assets in period t-1. By using assets in 
period t-1, our measure of change in ROA has the advantage that it is not affected by the 
phenomenon of newly privatized companies writing off unproductive assets with 
everything else remaining constant. Our measure would provide a biased indicator of 
change in ROA, however, if productive assets were sold and, as a result, both assets and 
profit (rather than just assets) diminished. However, only about 5% of the firms in our 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 However, the infamous tunneling (looting) of firms by some investment funds that occurred during large 
scale privatization is reported to have been less of a phenomenon by 1996.   14
sample actually reduced their assets.
22 Our other measure of profitability, the profit/sales 
ratio, has the advantage that it is based on two flow measures that are less sensitive to 
inflation and accounting conventions than ROA. In addition to examining profitability, 
we provide an understanding of whether corporate restructuring proceeds more on the 
revenue or cost side (the two main components of profit) by using the rate of change in 
sales revenue and in labor cost as two additional indicators of performance.
23 . It is 
notable that since wages in public and private firms moved in tandem during this period 
(Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2002), the rate of change of labor cost reflects primarily an 
effect on employment. 
Our working data set contains 2,529-2,949 observations on an unbalanced panel 
of 1,371-1,540  medium and large firms from all economic sectors during the period 
1996-1999. As we indicate in Table 1, the exact number of observations and firms varies 
slightly across the four performance indicators. The observations represent a cleaned data 
set from the entire population of firms that were listed on the Prague Stock Exchange 
(PSE) in 1996. Since virtually all large and medium-sized firms privatized in large scale 
privatization were listed on PSE, the data set contains most of these firms. In addition to 
performance variables, our data set contains detailed measures of ownership structure, 
sector in which the firm operates, and the firm’s privatization history (including 
performance and institutional data from the pre-privatization period). The data sample 
was compiled by the authors from information provided by Aspekt, a commercial 
                                                           
22 Firms that substantially reduced assets significantly were removed from our sample when we eliminated 
outliers, as we discuss below. 
23 We do not use other measures of performance, such as material costs, because the sample size would be 
substantially reduced due to limited information on other variables in the data.   15
database, the PSE, The National Property Fund (the privatization agency) of the Czech 
Republic, and the Business Register of the Czech Republic. 
It is well known that firm-level data from transition and emerging market 
economies often suffer from accounting deficiencies and usually contain missing values 
and outlier observations that may bias the estimated coefficients (e.g., Filer and 
Hanousek, 2002). Firms operating in the Czech Republic started adopting international 
accounting (IAP) standards in 1992, and our discussions with international accounting 
firms located in the country indicate that this process was by and large completed in 
1995. Our 1996-99 data are hence from a period in which IAP already dominated local 
accounting standards. Moreover, the data are reported by firms that had to conform to the 
standards demanded in the second half of the 1990s by the main regulatory institutions, 
namely the PSE, the National Property Fund and the Czech National Bank. The data are 
hence relatively reliable and free from the accounting deficiencies that plague earlier 
studies. 
We have adopted a three-step approach to handling missing observations and 
outliers in the original data set of 2682, 3050, 2648, and 2972, year-to-year rate of change 
observations for profit/sales, ROA, sales, and labor costs, respectively. First, we 
eliminated the few (rate of change) observations that were based on inconsistent values in 
the levels of variables, such as negative values of sales or labor cost. This resulted in 
2679, 3050, 2644, and 2972 observations for the rate of change of profit over sales, ROA, 
sales, and labor cost, respectively. 
Second, since the data still contained a number of observations with fairly 
extreme values, we examined the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the trimming of   16
these extreme values of variables, identifying points where the results became relatively 
insensitive to further trimming. We found that the estimates ceased being sensitive to 
trimming at the point where the year-to-year rate of change in the performance indicators 
was constrained to the wide interval of (-300%, 300%) for profit over sales, (-40%, 40%) 
for ROA and (-100%, 300%) for sales and labor costs.
24 Imposing these wide limits led to 
a relatively modest reduction in the number of observations and resulted in 2168 
observations for the rates of change in profit over sales, 2905 for ROA, 2592 for sales, 
and 2949 for labor cost. We have used Heckman’s (1979) procedure to correct for the 
possible sample selection bias brought about by the two-step data cleaning procedure.
25 
Third, we explored the possibility of creating a balanced data set with the same 
firm-year pairs across the four performance indicators. We found that this would require 
reducing the number of observations for the rate of change of profit over sales, ROA, 
sales, and labor costs by 148 (7%), 885 (30%), 572 (22%), and 929 (31%), respectively, 
resulting in a sample with only 1210 firms and 2020 observations. We have considered 
this further reduction in the number of observations to be excessively large. We have 
hence used the larger sample from step two above, but we have also generated Heckman-
corrected estimates based on the balanced sub-sample for comparison (not reported here). 
The findings based on the balanced sub-sample are broadly similar to those based on the 
larger sample. 
On average, within the four-year (1996-99) period we have data for three 
consecutive years to compute annual rates of change of performance variables (Table 
                                                           
24 In contrast, the estimated coefficients change dramatically and non-monotonically as we add the outlying 
observations beyond this borderline to the sample. 
25 In particular, using the original set of observations we first ran a Heckman-type probit equation, 
predicting the probability that a given observation is included in the subsample on the basis of the   17
1).
26 In terms of the number of firms and observations, our sample is larger than samples 
used in previous and most ongoing studies in this area. More detailed summary statistics 
of performance indicators by ownership type and ownership extent are presented in 
appendix tables A1 and A2. We have also carried out a number of checks against official 
and private records to verify that our ownership information is reliable and that we hence 
meet the criticism of earlier privatization studies raised by Filer and Hanousek (2002). 
4.2 Ownership Data 
In section 3 we have described types of owners and categories of ownership that 
we are able to identify. As may be seen in Table 2, domestic industrial companies are the 
most frequent single largest owners (SLOs) with 1, 244 observations, followed by 
domestic investment funds (423 observations), domestic individuals (335) and the Czech 
state (174). Foreign industrial companies are by far the most frequent SLOs among the 
foreign investors (236 observations), with the total number of foreign SLO observations 
being 303. Ownership concentration, measured by the average stake held by a SLO, is 
between 38 and 59 percent, which is rather high in comparison to ownership 
concentration in developed countries (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and it resembles more 
the continental European than Anglo-American ownership concentration patterns.
27 
Foreign owners as a group tend to hold majority ownership stakes in firms (panel 
B of Table 2). The situation is just the opposite for domestic private owners and the state, 
both of which have average stakes around 43-45 percent and display absolutely and 
relatively more cases of blocking and legal minority ownership than majority ownership. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
following variables: the initial values of the performance indicators and their squares and products, as well 
as dummy variables capturing the presence of a given firm in a particular privatization wave. 
26 There are 34 sales and 28 labor cost observations for which the rate of growth is equal to -1. This means 
that only a minor number of firms in our sample ended production during the analyzed period. 
27 For development of ownership structures in voucher-privatized firms, see Kočenda and Valachy (2002).   18
Moreover, the state retains a golden share primarily in firms in which it or domestic 
private owners are the SLO. Finally, there are 33 observations with highly dispersed 
ownership in the sense that no type of owner has even a legal (10 percent) minority 
ownership. These observations come from 25 firms that are larger than average in terms 
of total assets, but otherwise tend to have quite diverse characteristics.
28  
In panels A and B of Table 3, we present two transition matrices depicting the 
1996-99 changes in firm ownership by extent and type of ownership, respectively. The 
flows by the extent of state, domestic private and foreign ownership (Panel A) show that 
majority foreign and majority domestic ownership forms are stable in that 73 percent and 
68 percent of firms that were in these two categories in 1996, respectively, were in the 
same categories also in 1999. Together with the category of blocking minority domestic 
firms, these two categories are also the main ownership forms to which firms switched 
from other categories, especially from blocking and legal minority state ownership, legal 
minority foreign ownership and neither majority nor minority ownership. When measured 
by the type of SLO (Panel B), domestic and foreign industrial companies are the most 
stable forms, retaining respectively 69 and 75 percent of their 1996 firms in 1999. 
Together with the domestic investment funds and individually owned companies, these 
two ownership forms are also the main recipients of firms from other categories, 
especially domestic portfolio companies and banks and foreign other (non-industrial) 
firms. Overall, there was hence a substantial amount of ownership changes even during 
the relatively stable, post-privatization period under study. In terms of the categories in 
                                                           
28 The firms belong to various sectors, with 7 being in trade and 4 in construction and building materials 
sectors. In 5 firms foreign owners have the largest, albeit relatively small, stakes. The state holds the golden 
share in two of these firms, both of which are water supply utilities. 
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Table 3, 15 to 31 percent of our sample changed category by extent of ownership and 7 to 
48 percent by type of SLO, with the greatest (smallest) shift being toward an industrial 
company (bank) as the SLO. The ownership changes were relatively evenly distributed 
over the 1996-99 period, with no single year showing unusually pronounced shifts. 
4.3 Selection Bias and Endogeneity of Ownership 
As is the case in several other studies (e.g., Frydman et al. 1999), we use firm-
specific fixed effects (first-differencing) as a panel data treatment evaluation procedure to 
control for the possibility that firms are not assigned to different ownership categories at 
random and certain types of owners (e.g., foreigners) may acquire firms that are 
inherently superior performers. This approach is not adequate, however, if the firm-
specific unobserved characteristics that are correlated with ownership and performance 
are time-varying rather than fixed. We therefore also use IV estimators as an alternative 
approach to control for possible endogeneity of post privatization (1996) ownership. 
Unlike other studies that use the IV approach in this context (see e.g., Megginson and 
Netter, 2001, and Djankov and Murrell, 2002 for reviews), we are able to control for 
ownership endogeneity using a unique set of firm-specific instrumental variables from the 
pre-privatization (pre-1992) period. The instrumental variables reflect economic, 
institutional, industry and geographic characteristics of the SOEs in the pre-market 
period, and we use them to instrument the initial post-privatization ownership that we 
observe in the market economy in 1996. 
For each firm selected for privatization, we have detailed information derived 
from all the proposed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before   20
privatization.
29 The number of privatization projects per se is an important IV since for 
many SOEs there were several privatization projects submitted, reflecting the degree of 
investor interest and expected future performance of the firm.
30 Moreover, for each 
privatized firm we use as IVs the pre-privatization data on registered (share) capital, net 
asset value, total number of shares, number of shares entering voucher privatization, 
number of shares allocated through voucher privatization, value of shares allocated 
through voucher privatization in voucher points, geographic and industry location of the 
firm, and the structure of share ownership among various domestic and foreign parties as 
proposed in the winning privatization project. The share ownership variables include the 
share that the government intended to keep for the short vs. long term. Short-term 
government ownership reflects the expectation of the government of being able to sell 
appreciated shares shortly after privatization, while long-term government ownership 
indicates an expectation of slower appreciation of the value of the privatized firm and/or 
its strategic character in the economy. Parts of the shares retained by the government 
were also classified as intended for restitution or future sale through an intermediary. 
Finally, our IV dataset contains annual observations on the SOE’s sales, profit, debt, and 
employment for three consecutive years prior to privatization. The three year nature of 
these data permits us to capture short-term trends in enterprise performance before 
                                                           
29 Privatization of each enterprise was based on an officially accepted privatization project. The 
management of each enterprise had to submit a privatization proposal, but any domestic or foreign firm, 
institution or individual could present a competing privatization project. All proposals were to be 
considered on an equal footing by the privatization authorities, which worked with the investors to ensure 
that the final submitted proposals reflected at least in part government objectives in terms of ownership 
structure and other characteristics. Each project proposals had to contain recent economic and financial 
information about the enterprise and describe the proposed method of privatization, as well as the proposed 
organization of the privatized enterprise. See Kotrba and Svejnar (1994) for a description of the 
privatization projects. 
30 In the case of larger firms, a number of proposals were submitted for privatizing a particular small asset 
that was not connected with the firm’s production process (e.g., the firm’s recreational facility in a national   21
privatization. For the sake of comparability across firms, we scale these indicators by the 
total number of shares. The list of the instrumental variables along with their summary 
statistics is contained in Appendix Tables A3-A5. 
 
5. The Econometric Model 
5.1 Model Specification 
Our main goal is to analyze the performance effects of the principal types of 
ownership that were established during large-scale privatization (1992-95) and 
immediately thereafter (1995-96). In addition, we want to control for and estimate the 
effects of the substantial changes in ownership that took place in the 1996-99 post-
privatization period that we analyze. In order to carry out this analysis, we first adapt the 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1989) panel data treatment 
evaluation procedure for this context. 
Let Xijt be a given performance indicator, with subscript i denoting an individual 
firm under ownership type j, in year t, and let yijt be the percentage change of Xijt from t - 
1 to t. Moreover, let Pijt denote ownership type j of firm i in year t. A logarithmic model 
of performance may be specified as 
ijt t j ij j ij j ij j ij i ijt D t P P t X t P t X υ ϕ φ τ δ γ β α α τ τ + + − + + + + + =
'
1 1 )] ( [   ) ( ) ( ln  (1) 
which may be expressed in the annual rate of change (first-difference) specification as
31 
                                                                                                                                                                             
park). In order to avoid mixing these privatizations with those covering principal productive activities, we 
only consider projects aiming at privatization 10% or more of the enterprise’s assets. 
31 Equation (2) may also be viewed as coming from a framework such as that invoked in the endogenous 
growth literature (e.g., Temple, 1999; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), where the rate of change of the 
dependent variable may depend on its initial level (e.g., rate of change of performance being related to an 
initial level of investment) and some other variables. In the context of the debate about the performance 
effects of ownership vs. competition, we therefore focus on the effects of ownership, while controlling for 
the extent of competition by the firm-specific fixed effects, the effect of initial performance interacted with 
the time trend, and the industry-specific and annual time dummy variables interacted with time.   22
ijt t j ij j ij j ij j ij ijt D P P X P y ε ϕ φ δ γ β α τ τ + + + ∆ + + + =   1 1   .    (2) 
In equation (1), the vector of coefficients αi  controls for firm-specific (fixed effect) 
differences in performance across firms, α represents the base, time-varying effect of 
state ownership, column vector βj captures the time varying effects of other types of 
initial post-privatization ownership Pij1 that are measured relative to the base effect α of 
state ownership. Vector γj controls for the effect of initial post-privatization level of 
performance  Xij1 on the future rate of change of performance, vector δj captures the 
contemporaneous (instantaneous) effect observed in any year τ after 1996 if a firm 
changed its 1996 ownership to a new ownership category -- ∆Pijτ . Vector φj reflects the 
permanent effect associated with a new type of ownership Pijτ established at time τ after 
large-scale privatization. Vector ϕ represents the effect of the annual, industry and form 
of privatization dummy variables. Finally, Dt is a vector of annual and industry/sector 
dummies, and dummy variables indicating whether the firm was privatized in the first or 
second wave of the voucher scheme or outside of it (Dt = D′t - D′t-1 and εijt = υijt - υijt-1).
32 
Coding the dummy variables so that the effects of non-state ownership forms is 
measured relative to the effect of state ownership is useful because firms in which the 
state retains ownership and control are the least privatized and on average probably also 
the least transformed ones. The approach also accords with our desire to investigate 
change in performance as firms switch from state to private ownership. 
                                                           
32 An analogous approach, focusing on firm performance immediately before and immediately after 
privatization, was employed by Frydman et al. (1999). In particular, Frydman et al. (1999) used the 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1989) approach to estimate an ownership-group fixed 
effects model of the form  ijt ct ct ijt j ijt j ijt D X P y ε δ γ β α + + + + = −1 , where Dct denoted a vector of annual 
country and dummy variables, as well as a firm-specific fixed-effects model:   23
Our specification controls for the effects on the rate of change of performance of 
fixed differences among firms that were or were not part of the voucher scheme, inter-
firm differences in the initial post-privatization performance, industry-specific fixed 
effects (proxying for factors such as the degree of competition or differences in 
technology), and annual economy-wide shifts (such as macro shocks or degree of 
openness to trade). As we discuss below, these variables also control for potential 
endogeneity of ownership as firms with different performance may have been channeled 
to different parts of the privatization program, which in turn may have affected their 
initial performance after privatization. Finally, we control for possible endogeneity 
problems associated with changes in ownership in the 1996-99 period by including 
ownership group fixed effects δj for firms undergoing these ownership changes.
33 These 
δj effects may also reflect the instantaneous effects of new ownership on performance. 
An important issue that arises in the context of post-privatization behavior of 
firms is the dynamics of their restructuring and performance. The performance effect of 
short-term (defensive or reactive) restructuring is for instance often hypothesized to differ 
from the medium-term (strategic) restructuring associated with different forms of 
ownership (e.g., Blanchard, 1997, Roland, 2000, and Carlin et al., 2001). Moreover, 
strategic restructuring may take time to carry out and it may hence have a performance 
effect that varies over time. Blanchard (1997) has for example hypothesized that the 
effect of privatization would tend to have a U-shaped effect on employment and we 
conjecture that there may be non-linear effects on other dependent variables as well. We 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ijt ct ct j ijt i ijt D P y ε δ β α + + + = . The estimates from these two models are unfortunately not directly 
comparable since the latter model omits Xijt-1  and is hence not a direct extension of the former one.   24
hence also estimate a model that allows the performance effects of the various ownership 
forms to vary linearly and quadratically with time, where time is measured as the number 
of years since 1996 and since any subsequent change of ownership at time τ:
34 
+ ∆ + + + + + + + = j ij j ij j ij j ij j ij ijt P X t P t P P t t y δ γ β β β α α α τ 1
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An interesting feature of our data is that we are able to explore the effect of 
ownership forms in two key directions. First, we can examine whether majority, blocking 
minority and legal minority ownership of a particular type affects the firm’s post-
privatization performance. We can also assess if the state can affect performance by 
retaining a golden share that gives it the right to block certain managerial decisions. 
Second, we can evaluate the performance effects associated with different types of single 
largest owners, and whether the SLOs have a majority, blocking minority, or legal 
minority stake. The ability to distinguish these ownership forms enables us to provide 
evidence with respect to the key issues discussed earlier. 
Extent of Ownership 
As we discussed in Section 3, the analysis of the effect of majority and blocking 
minority ownership is important because these categories of ownership are widely 
believed to have major effects on corporate governance and performance of firms. 
Assessing the effect of legal minority is also important because it is an easier ownership 
stake to obtain and it gives the owner legal rights that enable him to influence corporate 
governance and performance. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33 Analogously to including Xij1 as a regressor, we have also estimated models controlling for Xijτ , the 
effect of performance achieved by the previous owner at the time of change of ownership τ on future 
performance. This specification did not produce materially different results from those of equation (2).   25
Since the relative performance of state, domestic private and foreign ownership is 
one of the major issues in the privatization debate, we first focus our analysis on these 
three categories of ownership. In particular, we allow corporate performance to depend on 
whether private domestic owners as a group, foreign owners as a group or the state have a 
majority, blocking minority or legal minority share ownership in the firm, and we also 
account for the effect of the state retaining a golden share.  
The Single Largest Owner 
In the above analysis of the extent of ownership, we focus on the effects of 
majority and blocking or legal minority ownership, irrespective of how many different 
owners of the same type comprise the majority or minority groups. Highly concentrated 
and widely dispersed ownership within a given group is hence assumed to have the same 
effect on performance, a feature that may be too restrictive. In the second prong of our 
analysis, we therefore focus on the effects of the single largest owner (SLO) and we 
exploit the fact that our data permit us to distinguish among eight different types of SLOs 
as well as the extent of their ownership. 
5.2 Methods of Estimation 
As mentioned earlier, the firms in our sample may display systematic 
heterogeneity because they were privatized in the large-scale privatization program, both 
within and outside the voucher scheme that occurred in two waves, and because Gupta et 
al. (2000) find that better performing firms tended to be privatized in the first wave. 
Moreover, firms privatized earlier have a longer post-privatization period before we 
observe them in our data in 1996. To control for the potential endogeneity bias stemming 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 Since the time period is short, we use this second-order Taylor series approximation for the underlying 
nonlinear form.   26
from these phenomena, we account for firm-specific fixed effects by running the 
regressions in a first-difference form and including as regressors dummy variables for 
whether the firm was privatized in the first or second wave of the voucher scheme or 
outside of it (within large-scale privatization in general), the level of performance of the 
firm after large-scale privatization in 1996, and industry/sector and annual dummy 
variables (vector D).
35 Moreover, we also carry out estimations in which we instrument 
the 1996 ownership using the IVs described in Section 4.3 above.
36 We use the Hausman 
(1978) specification test for assessing endogeneity of this initial post-privatization 
ownership, comparing the results of first-difference OLS estimation assuming the original 
ownership is exogenous with the first-difference IV method in which we treat ownership 
as potentially endogenous and instrument it by the set of IVs described above. The test is 
carried out by differencing the two sets of parameter estimates and standardizing the 
vector of differences by the difference in the covariance matrices of the two sets of 
estimates. The resulting quadratic form is asymptotically chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of parameters being tested.
37 We report estimates that are 
generated by the Huber (1967)--White (1982) procedure to provide heteroskedasticity 
adjusted residuals without and with instrumental variables for origin of ownership. 
Finally, we have also checked that the residuals are free from serial correlation. 
                                                           
35 When expressed as a model of the determinants of the level of firm performance, along the lines of 
equation (3), it is clear that the present specification controls for firm-specific fixed effects and allows the 
above dummy variables and the 1996 performance variable to control for systematic linear differences in 
post-privatization performance over time. 
36 We have also employed the Kruskal-Wallis (1952) test to check for differences in the 1996-99 variation 
of the performance variables of firms from the first and second wave of the voucher scheme, as well as the 
difference in each of these sets of firms and those privatized outside of the voucher scheme. The test does 
not find the variation in the growth rates of variables for the three sub-samples to be different from one 
another. 
37 In practice, some diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are negative. As usual, we carry out the test 
only for parameters corresponding to the positive diagonal elements, with a corresponding correction to the 
degrees of freedom, using the generalized inverse matrix (procedure YINVO in TSP 4.5).   27
 
6. Empirical Results 
  Our empirical strategy is to start from the broad model that incorporates the time-
varying effects (equation (3)) and test restrictions implying that the effect of ownership 
on the performance indicators is constant over time (equation (2)). In particular, for each 
type of ownership we first test whether the coefficients on the ownership dummy variable 
and its linear and quadratic interaction with time are jointly statistically significant. When 
the F-test indicates that the three coefficients are jointly significant, we test whether the 
two coefficients on ownership interacted with time and with time squared are jointly 
significant. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, we report the mean effect of the given 
ownership, calculated from the three estimated coefficients and from the mean values of 
the three variables. Next to the reported coefficients, we also indicate whether the 
underlying effect is convex, or U-shaped (U), or concave, inverted U-shaped (∩), with 
time. When the three coefficients are jointly not significant or when they are significant 
but the effect of the linear and quadratic interaction of ownership with time is 
insignificant, we report the coefficient on the ownership dummy variable from a 
specification that constrains the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms in time to 
be zero. In order to make the estimates easily interpretable, we report the associated p-
values from the relevant F-test or t-test in parentheses. 
In Tables 4-7, we present the estimated coefficients of equations (2) or (3) as 
determined by the aforementioned model selection tests. We start with the performance 
effects of the initial post-privatization extent of ownership in Table 4 and then turn to the 
permanent effects of subsequent changes in the extent of ownership in Table 5. We next   28
present results for the single largest owner (SLO) – the effects of initial post-privatization 
ownership in Table 6 and permanent effects of subsequent changes in Table 7. In every 
table, we present the first-difference OLS estimates that are analogous to the existing 
literature and the first-difference IV results that we view as yielding a superior way to 
control for endogeneity of ownership. Presenting the two sets of estimates also provides a 
check on whether the first-difference approach adequately controls for endogeneity. 
Results of the Hausman test confirm that the 1996 initial ownership should be treated as 
endogenous.
38 The complete set of regression estimates is provided in Appendix Tables 
A6-A9. 
Effects of the Extent of State, Private and Foreign Ownership 
In Tables 4 and 5, each performance variable is related to whether domestic 
private owners, foreign owners or the state have a majority, blocking minority, legal 
minority, or less than legal minority ownership, and whether the state keeps a golden 
share in the firm. The constant reflects the 1996-97 rate of change in performance of 
firms that have majority state ownership, were partially privatized outside of the voucher 
scheme, and operate in the miscellaneous (“other”) category of the nineteen industries for 
which we control. The estimated coefficients on the various forms of ownership represent 
the average annual ownership effects relative to the above effect of majority state 
ownership. 
 
Initial Post-privatization Ownership 
                                                           
38 We reject the null hypothesis of ownership being exogenous in regressions including all performance 
variables but profit/sales (significant on 7% test level). However, in the case of profit/sales neither model 
shows a good fit of the data. This fact may to a large extent explain the non-rejection of the null hypothesis.   29
As may be seen from Table 4, there are few significant effects of the extent of 
different types of initial post-privatization ownership on performance. Starting with 
profitability, we see that majority foreign ownership has a positive effect on ROA in the 
OLS but not in the IV model. Similarly, legal minority foreign ownership has a negative 
effect on ROA in the OLS but not the IV specification. In terms of the profit/sales ratio, 
we register a positive OLS but not IV effect of blocking minority foreign ownership and, 
as in the case of ROA, a negative OLS but not IV effect of legal minority foreign 
ownership. Hence, while the OLS estimates suggest that foreign ownership has some 
effects on profitability, the IV specification indicates that these effects are statistically 
insignificant and that different types and extent of initial ownership do not affect the two 
measures of profitability. Since the IVs have a relatively good predictive power (the R
2s 
in the IV regressions ranging from 0.1 to 0.3), the OLS results appear to be driven by 
foreign firms acquiring local firms with particular characteristics rather than affecting the 
acquired firms’ performance.
39  
In terms of sales revenue, reported in the third set of columns of Table 4, initial 
majority state ownership (the base) is associated with a negative effect in the IV model 
and firms with majority foreign ownership and those with highly dispersed ownership 
constitute the only groups that display a strong positive coefficient that counteracts this 
negative base effect.  
In both the OLS and IV models, we observe a negative effect of initial majority 
domestic ownership on the rate of change of labor cost, an effect that is also detected for 
blocking minority domestic ownership in the IV model (the fourth set of columns in 
                                                           
39 The R
2 was derived for the extent of each type of ownership from a linear probability model and a logit 
model (scaled R2). The two sets of R2s are similar. The tables in the paper are based on the logit   30
Table 4). In the first-difference OLS model, we also find marginally significant positive 
effects of majority state and highly dispersed ownership, but these effects disappear in the 
IV model. As mentioned earlier, since wages in public and private firms moved in 
tandem during this period (Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2002), the negative effect of 
concentrated domestic ownership on labor cost is primarily an effect on employment. 
Overall, the effects of initial post privatization ownership obtained from the first-
difference OLS and IV estimations indicate that foreign owners tend to acquire high 
stakes in firms whose characteristics predispose them to be relatively profitable, 
differences in ownership per se do not affect profitability, concentrated foreign 
ownership as well as highly dispersed ownership increase sales revenue, and highly as 
well as moderately concentrated domestic owners reduce labor cost (mostly by 
defensively cutting employment) relative to others. The asymmetric findings with respect 
to sales and labor cost effects of concentrated domestic and foreign owners are 
provocative because it has been generally presumed that both domestic and foreign 
private ownership, especially in highly concentrated forms, leads to substantial strategic 
restructuring and increases in sales -- domestically and/or on the world markets. We have 
checked the sensitivity of these results to sample trimming and find that they are robust in 
that even in the OLS model majority foreign ownership generates a positive effect on 
sales with additional trimming of about 10% of observations with the most extreme 
values of sales. 
As may be seen from the last row of Table 4, firms in which the state retains a 
golden share register a positive effect on ROA but not profit/sales. They also generate an 
increase in the annual rate of increase in labor costs and in the IV regression also in sales. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
specification of the IV regression.   31
These effects suggest that the state pursues an objective of increasing employment and 
output (revenue), while also inducing profit-oriented restructuring relative to assets. Since 
the state retains golden shares primarily in state-owned and domestic private firms (Table 
2), the effect of a golden share moderates the IV effects of firms with majority state 
ownership to reduce output (sales) and the IV as well as OLS effect of domestic majority 
and blocking minority owners to reduce labor cost (employment). 
Changes in Post-Privatization Ownership 
In Table 5, we report our estimates of the permanent effects of ownership changes 
that took place during 1996-99.
40 Conceptually, these estimates correspond to the 
estimates of the effect of initial 1996 ownership reported in Table 4. As may be seen from 
the table, the first-difference OLS and IV estimates are broadly similar. 
Starting with the ROA and profit/sales ratio, we see from both the OLS and IV 
models that a switch to majority domestic ownership results in a (weakly significant) 
positive permanent effect on both measures of profit. The instantaneous OLS (and less 
significantly the IV) effects reported in the appendix Table A6 (A7) indicate that majority 
domestic owners also tend to acquire firms that perform below average in ROA and bring 
up their ROA in the following years. Interestingly, positive permanent effects on ROA 
are also observed with shifts to blocking minority foreign and legal minority domestic 
ownerships in both specifications and for shifts to majority foreign ownership in the OLS 
specification. Moreover, the relatively rare shifts to legal minority state ownership also 
generate sizable positive effects on profit/sales. Finally, while the three OLS estimates of 
the positive effects on ROA are U- or inverted U-shaped, the nonlinear effect disappears 
in the IV estimates.   32
The estimated effects of subsequent ownership on sales and labor cost are 
virtually all constant rather than U- or inverted U-shaped. A post-1996 shift to majority 
foreign ownership has a positive effect on the rate of change of sales revenue that is not 
accompanied by a parallel increase in labor cost. This suggests that foreign owners that 
acquire majority stakes in firms after privatization engage in productivity-enhancing 
strategic restructuring. In contrast, shifts to blocking minority state and domestic 
ownership bring about negative effect on both sales and labor cost, indicating that these 
somewhat less concentrated owners react defensively by downsizing the newly acquired 
companies.  Finally, shifts to legal minority state and foreign ownership, as well as highly 
dispersed ownership, tend to decrease the rate of increase of sales revenue in the OLS 
model, but only the very last effects carries over to the IV specification. Finally, highly 
dispersed ownership and in the OLS case also blocking minority foreign ownership are 
associated with positive effects on the rate of change of labor cost. 
Effects of Different Types of SLOs 
The performance effects of a given owner being or becoming the single largest 
owner (SLO) of the firm are reported in Tables 6 and 7.  
Initial Post-privatization Ownership 
The only initial post-privatization ownership that has a positive effect on 
profitability is that by a foreign industrial company on ROA in the OLS model and on 
profit/sales in the IV specification (Table 6). All five types of domestic non-state SLOs 
have effects that are not statistically different from the insignificant effect of the state 
SLO, while foreign non-industrial ownership has negative effects on ROA and 
profit/sales in the OLS but not IV specifications.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 The mostly insignificant instantaneous effects are reported in Appendix Tables A6 and A7.   33
The positive profit effects of initial ownership by foreign industrial company are 
accompanied by a positive effect on the rate of change of sales revenue. In contrast, the 
domestic industrial company ownership is associated with a negative effect on the rate of 
growth of labor cost and, in the OLS case, also sales. On average, the post-privatization 
foreign industrial owners thus increase profitability by enhancing the rate of growth of 
sales without changing the rate of growth of labor cost. Their domestic counterparts do 
not raise profitability but they reduce the rate of growth of labor cost and, together with 
the state- and otherwise-owned firms, also sales revenue. The restructuring carried out by 
foreign industrial firms is hence of a strategic nature, while that performed by the 
domestic industrial firms is of a defensive type. The other type of SLO that engages in 
significant defensive restructuring is the investment fund as it lowers significantly the 
rate of increase of labor cost but does not generate an increase in sales and profitability. 
The effect of the state retaining a golden share is similar for the extent of 
ownership and SLO with respect to the increase in labor cost (employment), but the 
positive effect of the golden share on sales and ROA is absent in the SLO specification. 
(In the OLS estimates, the positive effect of the golden share on the change in ROA 
remains.) 
Changes in Post-Privatization Ownership 
Post-privatization changes in the type of SLO generate a somewhat larger number 
of significant effects than initial post-privatization ownership. As may be seen from Table 
7, there are relatively few significant effects on profitability, with the most notable one 
being a positive effect of bank ownership on both ROA and profit/sales. In the case of 
ROA this long-term effect in part offsets a negative instantaneous effect observed at the   34
time of the shift to bank ownership (Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix). The fact that the 
instantaneous effect is negative for ROA and not for profit/sales permits us to infer that 
the banks acquire firms with (a) normal performance in terms of profit/sales and increase 
this measure of profitability over time and (b) relatively large and unproductive assets, as 
measured by below average ROA, and raise the value of this indicator over time.  
Interestingly, as foreign industrial companies become SLOs in the post-
privatization period, they bring about increased rates of growth of both sales and labor 
cost, thus suggesting that in this phase foreign companies acquire firms to expand 
production but they no longer hold back the rate of growth of labor cost (employment). In 
contrast, firms in which a domestic industrial firm becomes the single largest owner 
continue to reduce the rate of growth in labor costs. Finally, investment funds that 
become SLOs in the 1996-99 period acquire firms with a high rate of increase in labor 
cost (Tables A8-A9), but they reduce the rate of growth of both labor cost and sales 
revenue thereafter (Table 7).  
7. Concluding Observations 
Compared to other studies of the effects of ownership on corporate performance, 
we (a) have detailed information on the forms and concentration of ownership in a 
virtually complete population of medium and large firms in a model large-scale 
privatization economy, (b) use a four-year panel of data from the post privatization period 
when one can observe both short- and medium-term effects corresponding to defensive 
(reactive) and strategic restructuring, (c) have data conforming to the international 
accounting system, and (d) control systematically for endogeneity of ownership.   35
We estimate the effect of ownership along two important dimensions: (i) the 
extent of concentration of private domestic, private foreign, and state ownership, 
irrespective of the number of owners within each category and (ii) the particular type of 
owner in terms of eight principal categories of single largest owners (SLOs).  
Our empirical findings yield the following conclusions: 
1. Many types of private ownership do not generate superior dynamic performance 
relative to state ownership after large-scale privatization. 
2. When analyzing firm performance by the extent of concentration of ownership, foreign 
majority owners are found to be the only group that increases the rate of change of sales 
revenue (possibly as the foreign firms engage in strategic restructuring or sell the 
acquired firm’s product through their worldwide distribution channels) relative to 
majority state-owned firms. When we classify firms by the SLO, the firms that display 
this behavior are foreign industrial companies, with the caveat that when foreign 
industrial companies become the SLO during the post-privatization period, they tend to 
expand production by increasing both sales revenue and labor cost. 
3. Domestic private owners with relatively concentrated holdings reduce labor cost and in 
some cases also sales revenue relative to majority state-owned firms, thus reflecting 
defensive restructuring. When domestic private owners acquire majority stakes from the 
initial post-privatization owners, they tend to have a positive effect on profitability of the 
firm. 
4. The above results provide support for the agency theory prediction that concentrated 
ownership results in superior corporate performance. The findings are counter to models 
that view concentrated ownership as being deleterious to firm performance because   36
excessive control stifles managerial initiative and incentives to acquire information in 
situations of asymmetric information and high uncertainty or because it results in 
insufficient liquidity of the company’s stock. Finally, the lack of a positive profit and 
sales effect among virtually all types of domestic owners is consistent with the thesis that 
the presence of a large stockholder may not result in superior performance if this 
shareholder “loots” the firm at the expense of small shareholders – a phenomenon that 
has been documented in many case studies of firms in transition and emerging market 
economies. 
5. When we classify firms by the extent of ownership, we find support for (a rate of 
change form of) the hypothesis that firms restructure by lowering and later increasing 
employment.  
6. All specifications suggest that the state induces a higher rate of increase of the labor 
cost in firms where it retains a golden share. In the regressions based on the extent of 
ownership concentration (and to a lesser extent also in the SLO regressions) the golden 
share also generates a positive effect on ROA and sales revenue. With this form of 
managerial control, the state hence appears to pursue both a social (employment 
generating) objective and corporate restructuring. Since our analysis covers the period of 
rising unemployment, the state appears as a more economically and socially beneficial 
agent than has been argued in some other recent studies of the emerging market 
economies (e.g., Djankov and Murrell, 2002, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Overall, our study shows that after large-scale privatization of a completely state-
owned economy, foreign ownership leads to superior economic performance relative to 
all types and concentrations of domestic private and state ownership. Initial domestic   37
private ownership is not superior to state ownership, and in some categories (e.g., the 
most numerous category of ownership by an industrial company) it does not result in 
significantly higher profit, while reducing labor cost (employment) and in some 
specifications also sales. Yet, there are indications that some types of owners display 
different behavior in their capacity of initial post-privatization owners and subsequent 
owners. In particular, as initial post-privatization owners, majority domestic private 
owners reduce labor cost without generating a positive effect on sales or profit. However, 
as owners that acquire their stake later, majority domestic private owners increase profit 
without a negative effect on labor cost (employment). The behavior of domestic private 
owners may hence be evolving over time.   38
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Summary Statistics of Performance Indicators: 1996-1999
Table 1Majority     
held by SLO
Blocking Minority 
held by SLO
Legal Minority 
(Moderately 
Dispersed 
Ownership)
Other (Highly 
Dispersed 
Ownership)
Golden 
Share held 
by State
    Domestic 2115 44.84 758 679 656 22 80
  Foreign 303 57.14 165 86 45 7 9
  State 174 43.18 49 63 58 4 66
Total 2592 46.16 972 828 759 33 155
Majority     
held by SLO
Blocking Minority 
held by SLO
Legal Minority 
(Moderately 
Dispersed 
Ownership)
Other (Highly 
Dispersed 
Ownership)
Golden 
Share held 
by State
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. 1244 48.83 547 412 272 13 42
   Bank 33 46.42 11 14 7 1 1
   Invest. Fund 423 37.61 96 119 205 3 19
   Individual 335 38.92 82 99 150 4 13
   Portfolio Co. 80 45.06 22 35 22 1 5
   State 174 43.18 49 63 58 4 66
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. 236 58.81 139 60 30 7 6
   Others 67 51.23 26 26 15 0 3
Total 2592 46.16 972 828 759 33 155
Table 2 
Ownership Extent and Categories: Summary Statistics
Panel B: Type of Ownership by Single Largest Owner (SLO)
Type of single 
largest owner 
(SLO)
Num. of 
obs.
Mean size 
of stake (%)
Number of Observations
Panel A: Ownership Extent
Type of aggregate 
ownership
Num. of 
obs.
Mean size 
of stake (%)
Number of observations
Note: This table contains basic ownership statistics associated with the performance variable of sales. Statistics for other 
performance indicators are similar.  Ownership concentration categories include majority (more than 50% of shares), blocking 
minority (from more than 33 to 50% of shares), legal minority (at least 10% but not more than 33% of shares), and other (less than 
10% of shares). All  ownership categories are mutually exclusive. The golden share is an additional measure that is not associated 
with any particular extent of ownership.Majority State
Majority 
Domestic
Majority 
Foreign
Blocking 
Minority 
State
Blocking 
Minority 
Domestic
Blocking 
Minority 
Foreign
Legal 
Minority State
Legal 
Minority 
Domestic
Legal 
Minority 
Foreign
Other than 
Majority or 
Minority
Majority State 46% 29% 5% 2% 11% 4% 0% 2% 0% 0% 100%
Majority Domestic 0% 68% 6% 0% 19% 1% 0% 4% 1% 0% 100%
Majority Foreign 0% 13% 73% 0% 4% 9% 0% 1% 1% 0% 100%
Blocking Minority State 1% 21% 5% 15% 34% 3% 2% 9% 3% 6% 100%
Blocking Minority Domestic 0% 41% 3% 1% 37% 3% 1% 12% 1% 0% 100%
Blocking Minority Foreign 0% 21% 19% 0% 21% 35% 0% 2% 2% 0% 100%
Legal Minority State 1% 24% 2% 1% 27% 2% 24% 18% 1% 1% 100%
Legal Minority Domestic 0% 28% 2% 1% 34% 2% 1% 30% 1% 0% 100%
Legal Minority Foreign 0% 13% 18% 0% 17% 15% 0% 14% 22% 0% 100%
Other than Majority or Minority 0% 20% 5% 0% 19% 4% 3% 28% 3% 17% 100%
Dom. 
Industrial Co.
Dom. 
Bank
Dom. 
Invest. Fund
Dom. 
Individual
Dom. 
Portfolio Co. State
For. Industrial 
Co.
For. 
Other Total
Dom. Industrial Co. 69% 1% 11% 10% 2% 1% 6% 1% 100%
Dom. Bank 47% 5% 25% 8% 1% 1% 12% 2% 100%
Dom. Invest. Fund 50% 4% 28% 9% 2% 2% 4% 1% 100%
Dom. Individual 39% 1% 9% 43% 1% 1% 6% 1% 100%
Dom. Portfolio Co. 56% 2% 18% 14% 2% 2% 5% 1% 100%
State 47% 1% 8% 9% 1% 26% 7% 1% 100%
For. Industrial Co. 15% 0% 1% 3% 1% 0% 75% 5% 100%
For. Other 35% 1% 8% 15% 1% 0% 33% 8% 100%
Table 3
Panel B: Type of Ownership by the Single Largest Owner (SLO)
Panel A: Extent of State, Private Domestic and Foreign Ownership                                                                      
Movement of Firms across Ownership Categories: 1996-1999Majority State (Constant) -0.002 0.005 -0.176 -0.192 -0.111 -0.175 0.077 U 0.026
(0.875)   (0.731)   (0.311)   (0.282)   (0.193) (0.089) 10 (0.078) 10 (0.633)
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) 
Majority Domestic 0.007 0.001 -0.051 -0.001 -0.056 -0.067 -0.052 -0.077
(0.518)   (0.945) (0.700)   (0.992) (0.303) (0.552)   (0.097) 10 (0.032) 5
Majority Foreign 0.022 0.015 -0.022 -0.044 0.076 0.299 0.039 0.015
(0.058) 10 (0.231) (0.884)   (0.797) (0.225) (0.011) 1 (0.283) (0.743)
Blocking Minority State 0.008 0.001 -0.115 -0.145 -0.028 0.083 0.010 -0.017
(0.483)   (0.930) (0.449)   (0.388) (0.611) (0.438) (0.731) (0.608)
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.003 -0.009 -0.062 -0.069 -0.060 0.014 -0.029 -0.065
(0.755)   (0.456) (0.646)   (0.623) (0.269) (0.895) (0.321) (0.051) 5
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.011 -0.013 0.082 ∩ 0.063 -0.019 -0.098 -0.002 -0.063
(0.441)   (0.470) (0.044) 5 (0.766) (0.753) (0.714) (0.958) (0.181)
Legal Minority State -0.005 -0.012 0.006 -0.051 -0.051 -0.091 0.002 -0.030
(0.677)   (0.408) (0.970)   (0.747) (0.390) (0.507) (0.961) (0.510)
Legal Minority Domestic -0.001 -0.010 -0.148 -0.153 -0.043 0.058 -0.018 -0.049
(0.916)   (0.382) (0.257)   (0.261) (0.428) (0.569) (0.520) (0.131)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.002 U 0.003 -0.086 U 0.222 -0.002 -0.075 0.052 0.015
(0.035) 5 (0.887) (0.004) 1 (0.266) (0.979) (0.701) (0.341) (0.870)
Other than Majority or Minority -0.001 -0.020 0.090 0.141 0.168 0.358 0.084 0.068
(0.926)   (0.284) (0.607)   (0.468) (0.100) 10 (0.092) 10 (0.095) 10 (0.245)
Golden Share 0.013 ∩ 0.012 -0.012 -0.002 0.018 0.036 0.055 0.058
(0.001) 1 (0.048) 5 (0.895) (0.984) (0.441) (0.100) 10 (0.003) 1 (0.003) 1
OLS IV
Sales
OLS IV OLS
Effects of Initial Post-Privatization Ownership Extent on Performance
Table 4
Note: The dependent variables are the change in ROA and the rate of change of profit/sales, sales revenue and labor cost, respectively.  Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Number 1, 
5 and 10 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tail test, respectively. Industry, privatization, and year dummies are included. Symbol U denotes a U-shape effect over time 
(convex function). Symbol ∩ denotes an inverse U-shape effect over time (concave function).  
First - Difference OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; (P-values in parentheses)
ROA
IV
Labor Cost
OLS IV
Profit/SalesSubsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Majority Domestic 0.017 0.015 0.152 0.164 -0.027 -0.030 -0.022 -0.017
(0.060) 10 (0.099) 10 (0.103) 10 (0.088) 10 (0.497) (0.432) (0.550) (0.642)
Majority Foreign 0.007 U 0.009 -0.154 -0.145 0.085 0.086 0.022 0.037
(0.080) 10 (0.629) (0.316)   (0.374) (0.074) 10 (0.083) 10 (0.420) (0.198)
Blocking Minority State -0.050 -0.054 0.726 ∩ 0.552 -0.128 -0.171 -0.141 -0.136
(0.373)   (0.385) (0.004) 1 (0.611) (0.099) 10 (0.048) 5 (0.100) 10 (0.155)
Blocking Minority Domestic 0.005 0.006 0.017 0.008 -0.060 -0.056 -0.046 -0.045
(0.567)   (0.482) (0.857)   (0.929) (0.073) 10 (0.084) 10 (0.098) 10 (0.101) 10
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.020 ∩ 0.015 0.093 0.079 0.038 0.067 0.056 U 0.052
(0.053) 10 (0.100) 10 (0.557)   (0.607) (0.657) (0.434) (0.086) 10 (0.186)
Legal Minority State -0.026 -0.025 0.475 0.568 -0.126 -0.106 0.353 0.353
(0.380)   (0.433) (0.026) 5 (0.022) 5 (0.072) 10 (0.176) (0.180) (0.208)
Legal Minority Domestic 0.014 ∩ 0.017 0.025 0.045 0.012 0.006 -0.027 -0.018
(0.120) 10 (0.050) 5 (0.845) (0.715) (0.792) (0.890) (0.323) (0.482)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.004 -0.003 -0.028 -0.049 -0.162 -0.120 -0.009 -0.007
(0.839)   (0.870) (0.856)   (0.722) (0.062) 10 (0.136) (0.786) (0.840)
Other than Majority or Minority 0.070 0.073 0.385 U 0.445 -0.641 -0.387 0.439 0.440
(0.208)   (0.224) (0.003) 1 (0.306) (0.012) 5 (0.075) 10 (0.048) 5 (0.067) 10
Note: Same as in Table 4
Table 5
Profit/Sales Sales Labor Cost ROA
Permanent Effect of Subsequent Ownership Extent on Performance
First - Difference OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; (P-values in parentheses)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IVState (Constant) 0.003 0.004 -0.165 -0.197 -0.114 -0.141 0.111 ∩ 0.034
(0.802)   (0.709)   (0.225) (0.161) (0.133)   (0.063) 10 (0.008) 1 (0.519)
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) 
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.001 -0.002 -0.049 0.015 -0.061 -0.027 -0.071 -0.063
(0.794)   (-0.810) (0.507) (-0.850) (0.099) 10 (0.360) (0.007) 1 (0.007) 1
Bank 0.014 0.015 -0.072 0.005 0.060 0.025 0.052 0.043
(0.268)   (-0.290) (0.588) (-0.973) (0.348)   (0.750) (0.266)   (0.437)
Invest. Fund -0.003 -0.006 -0.081 -0.080 -0.005 0.015 -0.055 -0.071
(0.674)   (-0.404) (0.314) (-0.363) (0.853)   (0.650) (0.028) 5 (0.005) 1
Individual 0.001 0.001 -0.112 -0.081 0.004 0.022 -0.019 -0.027
(0.836)   (-0.934) (0.213) (-0.395) (0.909)   (0.545) (0.504)   (0.376)  
Portfolio Co. 0.000 -0.005 -0.098 -0.098 -0.014 0.042 -0.021 -0.012
(0.970)   (-0.685) (0.429) (-0.465) (0.799)   (0.535) (0.612)   (0.821)  
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.016 0.013 0.086 0.180 0.072 0.107 0.030 0.026
(0.029) 5 (-0.129) (0.388) (0.101) 10 (0.069) 10 (0.011) 1 (0.239)   (0.405)  
Others -0.008 U -0.006 -0.278 -0.221 0.009 0.003 -0.034 -0.055
(0.019) 5 (0.710) (0.114) 10 (0.249) (0.899)   (0.971) (0.522)   (0.452)  
Golden Share 0.011 ∩ 0.009 -0.032 -0.017 0.006 0.014 0.052 0.062
(0.025) 5 (0.145) (0.724)   (0.855) (0.821)   (0.577) (0.030) 5 (0.001) 1
Note: Same as in Table 4
Labor Cost
Effect of Initial Single Largest Owner Type on Performance
Difference OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; (P-values in parentheses)
Table 6
ROA Profit/Sales Sales
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IVSubsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.011 -0.040 -0.026 -0.074 -0.041
(0.696)   (0.637) (0.956) (0.903) (0.160)   (0.336) (0.086) 10 (0.101) 10
Bank 0.086 0.118 0.388 ∩ 0.338 -0.169 -0.167 -0.090 -0.094
(0.075) 10 (0.025) 5 (0.081) 10 (0.101) 10 (0.199)   (0.264) (0.264)   (0.299)
Invest. Fund -0.013 U 0.004 0.060 0.062 -0.140 ∩ -0.096 -0.131 -0.104
(0.003) 1 (0.789) (0.628) (0.614) (0.092) 10 (0.061) 10 (0.014) 5 (0.003) 1
Individual 0.009 0.004 0.020 0.025 0.054 0.050 -0.053 -0.054
(0.508) (0.753) (0.897) (0.872) (0.524) (0.562) (0.316) (0.307)
Portfolio Co. 0.022 0.021 -0.088 -0.091 -0.175 -0.116 0.089 0.089
(0.271) (0.303) (0.679) (0.674) (0.099) 10 (0.045) 5 (0.349) (0.357)
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.012 0.007 0.118 0.094 0.057 0.061 0.110 0.087
(0.255) (0.493) (0.451) (0.538) (0.100) 10 (0.087) 10 (0.010) 1 (0.001) 1
Others 0.007 0.009 -0.421 -0.391 -0.088 -0.072 -0.024 -0.015
(0.693) (0.587) (0.057) 10 (0.003) 1 (0.372) (0.466) (0.740) (0.843)
Note: Same as in Table 4
Labor Cost
Permanent Effect of Subsequent Single Largest Owner Type on Performance
Difference OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; (P-values in parentheses)
Table 7
ROA Profit/Sales Sales
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IVMean Std. Dev. Min Max Num. Firms Num. Obs
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. ROA 0.002 0.100 -0.393 0.386 852 1389
Profit / Sales -0.278 1.013 -2.921 2.985 619 911
Sales -0.009 0.418 -1.000 2.431 766 1244
Labor Costs -0.014 0.353 -1.000 2.732 860 1410
   Bank ROA 0.008 0.121 -0.377 0.373 40 45
-0.141 0.907 -2.200 2.329 38 48
Sales 0.101 0.720 -1.000 2.820 29 33
Labor Costs 0.083 0.453 -0.782 1.876 39 43
   Invest. Fund ROA 0.006 0.109 -0.369 0.387 332 474
Profit / Sales -0.327 1.030 -2.995 2.954 280 397
Sales 0.016 0.444 -1.000 2.726 297 423
Labor Costs 0.024 0.401 -1.000 2.842 338 488
   Individual ROA -0.001 0.102 -0.385 0.387 258 380
Profit / Sales -0.308 0.992 -2.987 2.674 187 259
Sales 0.016 0.522 -1.000 2.691 224 335
Labor Costs -0.015 0.398 -1.000 2.248 252 379
   Portfolio Co. ROA -0.017 0.105 -0.349 0.367 88 98
Profit / Sales -0.289 1.111 -2.970 2.866 79 89
Sales -0.134 0.365 -1.000 0.987 72 80
Labor Costs -0.008 0.496 -1.000 2.750 88 100
   State ROA -0.006 0.052 -0.250 0.164 125 178
Profit / Sales -0.177 0.827 -2.947 2.621 192 250
Sales 0.026 0.217 -0.994 1.325 122 174
Labor Costs 0.081 0.238 -0.989 2.219 128 183
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. ROA -0.001 0.077 -0.298 0.235 154 259
Profit / Sales -0.129 0.871 -2.967 2.744 109 173
Sales 0.105 0.380 -1.000 2.795 140 236
Labor Costs 0.091 0.284 -1.000 1.643 157 265
   Others ROA -0.006 0.094 -0.368 0.257 68 82
Profit / Sales -0.413 0.757 -2.552 1.705 41 48
Sales -0.004 0.290 -0.902 0.868 57 67
Labor Costs 0.033 0.333 -0.800 1.613 68 81
Table A1
Summary Statistics of Performance Indicators by Ownership Type: 1996-1999Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Num. Firms Num.Obs
Majority State ROA -0.013 0.046 -0.154 0.098 34 46
Profit / Sales -0.167 0.906 -2.209 2.415 44 58
Sales 0.017 0.235 -0.880 0.567 35 49
Labor Costs 0.073 0.180 -0.742 0.541 36 50
Majority Domestic ROA 0.006 0.101 -0.385 0.386 554 870
Profit / Sales -0.269 0.958 -2.987 2.636 350 517
Sales -0.005 0.431 -1.000 2.820 480 758
Labor Costs -0.014 0.406 -1.000 2.732 553 880
Majority Foreign ROA 0.002 0.084 -0.298 0.257 111 185
Profit / Sales -0.234 0.821 -2.967 2.646 75 119
Sales 0.089 0.360 -1.000 1.707 99 165
Labor Costs 0.057 0.285 -1.000 1.643 113 188
Blocking Minority State ROA -0.003 0.049 -0.250 0.164 50 67
Profit / Sales -0.169 0.854 -2.947 2.621 71 96
Sales 0.015 0.140 -0.552 0.291 48 63
Labor Costs 0.077 0.155 -0.682 0.641 50 67
Blocking Minority Domestic ROA -0.004 0.099 -0.367 0.387 531 748
Profit / Sales -0.261 1.047 -2.905 2.813 371 484
Sales -0.005 0.441 -1.000 2.405 478 679
Labor Costs -0.021 0.339 -1.000 2.842 527 754
Blocking Minority Foreign ROA -0.001 0.063 -0.248 0.226 67 97
Profit / Sales -0.084 0.978 -2.868 2.744 45 56
Sales 0.055 0.413 -0.929 2.795 58 86
Labor Costs 0.094 0.319 -0.765 1.568 68 100
Legal Minority State ROA -0.005 0.060 -0.231 0.151 40 60
Profit / Sales -0.186 0.768 -2.559 2.269 74 92
Sales 0.047 0.273 -0.994 1.325 39 58
Labor Costs 0.094 0.343 -0.989 2.219 41 61
Legal Minority Domestic ROA 0.001 0.108 -0.393 0.387 483 743
Profit / Sales -0.330 1.047 -2.995 2.985 480 669
Sales 0.005 0.471 -1.000 2.726 437 656
Labor Costs 0.018 0.380 -1.000 2.750 491 759
Legal Minority Foreign ROA -0.024 0.095 -0.368 0.102 34 50
Profit / Sales -0.190 0.816 -2.627 2.432 30 40
Sales 0.102 0.310 -0.469 0.917 32 45
Labor Costs 0.090 0.276 -0.558 1.613 34 49
Other than Majority or Minority ROA 0.015 0.088 -0.248 0.245 31 39
Profit / Sales -0.276 0.739 -1.304 1.619 33 44
Sales -0.059 0.301 -1.000 0.283 25 33
Labor Costs 0.149 0.398 -0.463 2.073 31 41
Table A2 
Summary Statistics of Performance Indicators by Extent of Ownership: 1996-1999Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A
Registered Capital (in thousands of korunas) 419,607 1,877,644 3,141 49,200,000
Net Asset Value (in thousands of korunas) 489,480 2,178,180 3,490 56,000,000
Total Number of Shares 412,827 1,870,709 3,141 49,200,000
Number of Shares Entering Voucher Privatization 220,490 656,943 2,202 14,800,000
Number of Shares Allocated through Voucher Privatization 204,935 629,464 1,537 13,800,000
Value of Shares in Terms of Voucher Points 6,903,206 24,200,000 67,300 611,000,000
Regions Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Prague 15.83% 0.3651 0 1
Central Bohemia 8.14% 0.2735 0 1
Southern Bohemia 7.77% 0.2677 0 1
Western Bohemia 10.28% 0.3038 0 1
Northern Bohemia 11.32% 0.3169 0 1
Eastern Bohemia 12.72% 0.3333 0 1
Southern Moravia 18.71% 0.3902 0 1
Northern Moravia 15.24% 0.3595 0 1
Industrial Sectors
Agriculture 18.20% 0.3859 0 1
Heavy Machinery 29.88% 0.4579 0 1
Light Machinery 17.46% 0.3797 0 1
Constructions 13.02% 0.3366 0 1
Transportation 4.07% 0.1976 0 1
Trade 9.10% 0.2877 0 1
R & D 1.48% 0.1208 0 1
Services 4.29% 0.2027 0 1
Financial 0.96% 0.0976 0 1
Other 1.55% 0.1237 0 1
Note: The number of observation is 1352 for each variable
Table A3
                                                         Pre-Privatization Characteristics of Firms 
Panel B
Panel CVariable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max
Foreign Owner 1.3225 7.6277 0 75
Domestic Owner 3.7663 12.8294 0 74
Restitution 0.5222 3.0640 0 58
Fund of National Property (Temporary) 8.4615 16.6760 0 84
Fund of National Property (Permanent) 0.1709 2.3046 0 51
Sale Through Intermediary 2.0666 8.5860 0 75
Municipality Transfer 3.4379 13.3587 0 94
Other 3.0377 8.0087 0 81
Total Number of Privatization Projects 3.0178 7.0905 1 77
Note: The number of observation is 1352 for each variable
Table A4
Proposed Allocation of Shares Among Parties (in %)               Perfomance Indicators prior to Privatization
Variable per Share No. of observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Sales
3 years to privatization 1210 3.6350 40.3716 0.001050 1297.0630
2 years to privatization 1210 3.5091 46.8384 0.000000 1614.1270
1 year to privatization 1346 2.3407 7.0245 0.001787 200.0090
Profit
3 years to privatization 1196 0.2650 1.8867 -1.587883 43.7188
2 years to privatization 1269 0.3058 3.5251 -2.234356 117.8678
1 year to privatization 1338 0.1919 1.3306 -10.135990 38.4093
Debt
3 years to privatization 916 0.6610 2.0698 0.000249 31.8724
2 years to privatization 1021 0.6183 1.8527 0.000121 38.1252
1 year to privatization 1155 0.6284 2.1576 0.000092 32.1283
Employment
3 years to privatization 1221 0.0061 0.0150 0.000002 0.4177
2 years to privatization 1281 0.0057 0.0142 0.000002 0.3998
1 year to privatization 1348 0.0050 0.0132 0.000002 0.3812
Table A5ROA
Profit / 
Sales
Sales
Labor 
Cost
Majority State (Constant) -0.002 -0.176 -0.111 0.077 U
(0.875)   (0.311)   (0.193) (0.078) 10
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) - Initial Effect
Majority Domestic 0.007 -0.051 -0.056 -0.052
(0.518)   (0.700)   (0.303) (0.097) 10
Majority Foreign 0.022 -0.022 0.076 0.039
(0.058) 10 (0.884)   (0.225) (0.283)
Blocking Minority State 0.008 -0.115 -0.028 0.010
(0.483)   (0.449)   (0.611) (0.731)
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.003 -0.062 -0.060 -0.029
(0.755)   (0.646)   (0.269) (0.321)
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.011 0.082 ∩ -0.019 -0.002
(0.441)   (0.044) 5 (0.753) (0.958)
Legal Minority State -0.005 0.006 -0.051 0.002
(0.677)   (0.970)   (0.390) (0.961)
Legal Minority Domestic -0.001 -0.148 -0.043 -0.018
(0.916)   (0.257)   (0.428) (0.520)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.002 U -0.086 U -0.002 0.052
(0.035) 5 (0.004) 1 (0.979) (0.341)
Other than Majority or Minority -0.001 0.090 0.168 0.084
(0.926)   (0.607)   (0.100) 10 (0.095) 10
Subsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Majority Domestic 0.017 0.152 -0.027 -0.022
(0.060) 10 (0.103) 10 (0.497) (0.550)
Majority Foreign 0.007 U -0.154 0.085 0.022
(0.080) 10 (0.316)   (0.074) 10 (0.420)
Blocking Minority State -0.050 0.726 ∩ -0.128 -0.141
(0.373)   (0.004) 1 (0.099) 10 (0.100) 10
Blocking Minority Domestic 0.005 0.017 -0.060 -0.046
(0.567)   (0.857)   (0.073) 10 (0.098) 10
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.020 ∩ 0.093 0.038 0.056 U
(0.053) 10 (0.557)   (0.657) (0.086) 10
Legal Minority State -0.026 0.475 -0.126 0.353
(0.380)   (0.026) 5 (0.072) 10 (0.180)
Legal Minority Domestic 0.014 ∩ 0.025 0.012 -0.027
(0.120) 10 (0.845) (0.792) (0.323)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.004 -0.028 -0.162 -0.009
(0.839)   (0.856)   (0.062) 10 (0.786)
Other than Majority or Minority 0.070 0.385 U -0.641 0.439
(0.208)   (0.003) 1 (0.012) 5 (0.048) 5
Ownership Change (∆P ijτ) - Instantaneous Effect
Majority Domestic -0.017   -0.065 0.059 0.007
(0.084) 10 (0.576)   (0.218) (0.858)
Majority Foreign -0.010   0.110 -0.063 -0.051
(0.667)   (0.628)   (0.369) (0.280)
Blocking Minority State 0.034 -1.340 0.020 -0.024
(0.568)   (0.179) (0.825) (0.870)
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.014 0.132 0.071 0.033
(0.134)   (0.239) (0.076) 10 (0.315)
Blocking Minority Foreign -0.020 -0.107 0.024 0.074
(0.117) (0.598) (0.833) (0.289)
Legal Minority State 0.025 -0.603 -0.016 -0.400
(0.479)   (0.118) (0.888) (0.149)
Legal Minority Domestic -0.017 -0.103 -0.035 -0.032
(0.128)   (0.515) (0.571) (0.380)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.035 0.072 0.340 0.003
(0.233)   (0.776)   (0.010) 1 (0.955)
Other than Majority or Minority -0.070 0.136 0.232 -0.172
(0.235)   (0.716) (0.278) (0.530)
Golden Share 0.013 ∩ -0.012 0.018 0.055
(0.001) 1 (0.895) (0.441) (0.003) 1
Initial value (X ij1) -3.2E-01
  0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) 1 (0.051) 10 (0.413) (0.082) 10
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.001   0.041   0.062 -0.094
(0.902)   (0.740)   (0.357) (0.068) 10
Second Wave -0.008   0.032   0.075 -0.119
(0.419)   (0.801)   (0.269) (0.020) 5
Both Waves 0.006   -0.011   0.089 -0.099
(0.585)   (0.937)   (0.207) (0.067) 10
Adj. R square 0.141   0.051 0.014 0.034
Num. of Obs. 2905 2168 2592 2949
Non-instrumented Estimates (P-values in parentheses)
Table A6
Effect of Ownership Extent on Performance
Note: The dependent variables are the change in ROA and the rate of change of profit/sales, sales revenue and 
labor cost, respectively.  Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Number 1, 5 and 10 denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, two-tail test, respectively. Industry, privatization, and year dummies are included. Symbol U 
denotes a U-shape effect over time (convex function). Symbol ∩ denotes an inverse U-shape effect over time 
(concave function).  ROA
Profit / 
Sales
Sales
Labor 
Cost
Majority State (Constant) 0.005 -0.192 -0.175 0.026
(0.731)   (0.282)   (0.089) 10 (0.633)
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) - Initial Effect
Majority Domestic 0.001 -0.001 -0.067 -0.077
(0.945) (0.992) (0.552)   (0.032) 5
Majority Foreign 0.015 -0.044 0.299 0.015
(0.231) (0.797) (0.011) 1 (0.743)
Blocking Minority State 0.001 -0.145 0.083 -0.017
(0.930) (0.388) (0.438) (0.608)
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.009 -0.069 0.014 -0.065
(0.456) (0.623) (0.895) (0.051) 5
Blocking Minority Foreign -0.013 0.063 -0.098 -0.063
(0.470) (0.766) (0.714) (0.181)
Legal Minority State -0.012 -0.051 -0.091 -0.030
(0.408) (0.747) (0.507) (0.510)
Legal Minority Domestic -0.010 -0.153 0.058 -0.049
(0.382) (0.261) (0.569) (0.131)
Legal Minority Foreign 0.003 0.222 -0.075 0.015
(0.887) (0.266) (0.701) (0.870)
Other than Majority or Minority -0.020 0.141 0.358 0.068
(0.284) (0.468) (0.092) 10 (0.245)
Subsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Majority Domestic 0.015 0.164 -0.030 -0.017
(0.099) 10 (0.088) 10 (0.432) (0.642)
Majority Foreign 0.009 -0.145 0.086 0.037
(0.629) (0.374) (0.083) 10 (0.198)
Blocking Minority State -0.054 0.552 -0.171 -0.136
(0.385) (0.611) (0.048) 5 (0.155)
Blocking Minority Domestic 0.006 0.008 -0.056 -0.045
(0.482) (0.929) (0.084) 10 (0.101) 10
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.015 0.079 0.067 0.052
(0.100) 10 (0.607) (0.434) (0.186)
Legal Minority State -0.025 0.568 -0.106 0.353
(0.433) (0.022) 5 (0.176) (0.208)
Legal Minority Domestic 0.017 0.045 0.006 -0.018
(0.050) 5 (0.715) (0.890) (0.482)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.003 -0.049 -0.120 -0.007
(0.870) (0.722) (0.136) (0.840)
Other than Majority or Minority 0.073 0.445 -0.387 0.440
(0.224) (0.306) (0.075) 10 (0.067) 10
Ownership Change (∆P ijτ) - Instantaneous Effect
Majority Domestic -0.016 -0.066 0.059 0.004
(0.111) (0.571) (0.219) (0.925)
Majority Foreign -0.012 0.088 -0.052 -0.060
(0.598) (0.705) (0.462) (0.211)
Blocking Minority State 0.037 -1.385 0.073 -0.029
(0.581) (0.235) (0.452) (0.856)
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.015 0.140 0.069 0.033
(0.112) (0.213) (0.089) 10 (0.319)
Blocking Minority Foreign -0.019 -0.101 0.019 0.069
(0.145) (0.614) (0.872) (0.313)
Legal Minority State 0.023 -0.609 -0.024 -0.398
(0.536) (0.138) (0.848) (0.175)
Legal Minority Domestic -0.017 -0.110 -0.027 -0.042
(0.131) (0.482) (0.668) (0.244)
Legal Minority Foreign -0.034 0.078 0.344 0.012
(0.283) (0.780) (0.006) 1 (0.821)
Other than Majority or Minority -0.072 0.145 0.263 -0.171
(0.250) (0.760) (0.252) (0.560)
Golden Share 0.012 -0.002 0.036 0.058
(0.048) 5 (0.984) (0.100) 10 (0.003) 1
Initial value (X ij1) -3.2E-01 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) 1 (0.084) 10 (0.293) (0.164)
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.001 0.053 0.053 -0.089
(0.898) (0.671) (0.473) (0.089) 10
Second Wave -0.008 0.051 0.077 -0.115
(0.411) (0.697) (0.292) (0.027) 5
Both Waves 0.006 0.001 0.062 -0.096
(0.588) (0.995) (0.425) (0.079) 10
Adj. R square 0.108 0.008 0.019 0.038
Num. of Obs. 2905 2168 2592 2949
Table A7
Effect of Ownership Extent on Performance
Instrumented Estimates (P-values in parentheses)ROA   Profit / 
Sales
  Sales   Labor 
Cost
 
State (Constant) 0.003 -0.165 -0.114 0.111 ∩
(0.802)   (0.225) (0.133)   (0.008) 1
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) - Initial Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.001 -0.049 -0.061 -0.071
(0.794)   (0.507) (0.099) 10 (0.007) 1
Bank 0.014 -0.072 0.060 0.052
(0.268)   (0.588) (0.348)   (0.266)  
Invest. Fund -0.003 -0.081 -0.005 -0.055
(0.674)   (0.314) (0.853)   (0.028) 5
Individual 0.001 -0.112 0.004 -0.019
(0.836)   (0.213) (0.909)   (0.504)  
Portfolio Co. 0.000 -0.098 -0.014 -0.021
(0.970)   (0.429) (0.799)   (0.612)  
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.016 0.086 0.072 0.030
(0.029) 5 (0.388) (0.069) 10 (0.239)  
Others -0.008 U -0.278 0.009 -0.034
(0.019) 5 (0.114) 10 (0.899)   (0.522)  
Subsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.003 -0.005 -0.040 -0.074
(0.696)   (0.956)   (0.160)   (0.086) 10
Bank 0.086 0.388 ∩ -0.169 -0.090
(0.075) 10 (0.081) 10 (0.199)   (0.264)  
Invest. Fund -0.013 U 0.060 -0.140 ∩ -0.131
(0.003) 1 (0.628)   (0.092) 10 (0.014) 5
Individual 0.009 0.020 0.054 -0.053
(0.508)   (0.897)   (0.524)   (0.316)  
Portfolio Co. 0.022 -0.088 -0.175 0.089
(0.271)   (0.679)   (0.099) 10 (0.349)  
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.012 0.118 0.057 0.110
(0.255)   (0.451)   (0.100) 10 (0.010) 1
Others 0.007 -0.421 -0.088 -0.024
(0.693)   (0.057) 10 (0.372)   (0.740)  
Ownership Change (∆P ijτ) - Instantaneous Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.001 0.042 0.050 -0.014
(0.870)   (0.692)   (0.136)   (0.631)  
Bank -0.150 -0.109 0.065 -0.042
(0.007) 1 (0.768)   (0.693)   (0.705)  
Invest. Fund -0.012 0.087 0.100 0.151
(0.439)   (0.571)   (0.140)   (0.003) 1
Individual -0.017 0.133 -0.064 -0.087
(0.289)   (0.457)   (0.522)   (0.163)  
Portfolio Co. -0.044 0.231 -0.061 -0.171
(0.052) 5 (0.394)   (0.412)   (0.100) 10
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.024 0.103 0.067 -0.032
(0.133)   (0.597)   (0.335)   (0.535)  
Others -0.009 0.211 0.032 -0.007
(0.686)   (0.317)   (0.777)   (0.933)  
Golden Share 0.011 ∩ -0.032 0.006 0.052
(0.025) 5 (0.724)   (0.821)   (0.030) 5
Initial value (X ij1) -0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) 1 (0.046) 5 (0.307)   (0.147)  
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave -0.001 0.028   0.039 -0.096  
(0.942) (0.821)   (0.563)   (0.064) 10
Second Wave -0.009 0.037   0.056   -0.119  
(0.379) (0.771)   (0.403)   (0.020) 5
Both Waves 0.004 -0.012   0.068   -0.098  
(0.718) (0.932)   (0.324)   (0.072) 10
Adj. R square 0.019 0.029 0.048 0.074
Num. of Obs. 2905 2168 2592 2949
Note: Same as in Table A7. 
Non-instrumented Estimates (P-values in parentheses)
Effect of the Single Largest Owner (SLO) Type on Performance
Table A8ROA   Profit / 
Sales
  Sales   Labor 
Cost
 
State (Constant) 0.004 -0.197 -0.141 0.034
(0.709)   (0.161) (0.063) 10 (0.519)
Initial Ownership Size (P ij1) - Initial Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.002 0.015 -0.027 -0.063
(0.810) (0.850) (0.360) (0.007) 1
Bank 0.015 0.005 0.025 0.043
(0.290) (0.973) (0.750) (0.437)
Invest. Fund -0.006 -0.080 0.015 -0.071
(0.404) (0.363) (0.650) (0.005) 1
Individual 0.001 -0.081 0.022 -0.027
(0.934) (0.395) (0.545) (0.376)  
Portfolio Co. -0.005 -0.098 0.042 -0.012
(0.685) (0.465) (0.535) (0.821)  
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.013 0.180 0.107 0.026
(0.129) (0.101) 10 (0.011) 1 (0.405)  
Others -0.006 -0.221 0.003 -0.055
(0.710) (0.249) (0.971) (0.452)  
Subsequent Ownership Size (P ijτ) - Permanent Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.004 0.011 -0.026 -0.041
(0.637) (0.903) (0.336) (0.101) 10
Bank 0.118 0.338 -0.167 -0.094
(0.025) 5 (0.101) 10 (0.264) (0.299)
Invest. Fund 0.004 0.062 -0.096 -0.104
(0.789) (0.614) (0.061) 10 (0.003) 1
Individual 0.004 0.025 0.050 -0.054
(0.753) (0.872) (0.562) (0.307)
Portfolio Co. 0.021 -0.091 -0.116 0.089
(0.303) (0.674) (0.045) 5 (0.357)
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.007 0.094 0.061 0.087
(0.493) (0.538) (0.087) 10 (0.001) 1
Others 0.009 -0.391 -0.072 -0.015
(0.587) (0.003) 1 (0.466) (0.843)
Ownership Change (∆P ijτ) - Instantaneous Effect
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.002 0.043 0.047 -0.015
(0.807) (0.691) (0.159) (0.612)
Bank -0.152 -0.099 0.072 -0.037
(0.012) 1 (0.797) (0.693) (0.760)
Invest. Fund -0.012 0.087 0.106 0.154
(0.445) (0.571) (0.120) (0.002) 1
Individual -0.013 0.133 -0.062 -0.087
(0.425) (0.462) (0.539) (0.164)
Portfolio Co. -0.044 0.235 -0.057 -0.166
(0.051) 5 (0.392) (0.444) (0.123)
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. -0.021 0.112 0.066 -0.032
(0.178) (0.558) (0.344) (0.539)
Others -0.013 0.223 0.030 -0.009
(0.547) (0.288) (0.787) (0.913)
Golden Share 0.009 -0.017 0.014 0.062
(0.145) (0.855) (0.577) (0.001) 1
Initial value (X ij1) -0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) 1 (0.088) 10 (0.199) (0.161)
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.000 0.024 0.036 -0.093
(0.994) (0.847) (0.592) (0.072) 10
Second Wave -0.009 0.040 0.057 -0.117
(0.395) (0.761) (0.391) (0.022) 5
Both Waves 0.004 -0.022 0.064 -0.097
(0.676) (0.871) (0.354) (0.074) 10
Adj. R square 0.110 0.008 0.017   0.044
Num. of Obs. 2905 2168 2592 2949
Table A9
Effect of the Single Largest Owner (SLO) Type on Performance
Instrumented estimates (P-values in parentheses)
Note: Same as in Table A7.  
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